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Anti-Minority Riots in Unified Germany:




Anti-foreigner riots in eastern Germany in the early 1990s have usually been explained by
ethnonationalism or racism, ethnic competition for scarce resources, and opportunistic political
elites. If anti-minority riots are analyzed as a distinct phenomenon with a cross-sectional
approach, local political processes emerge as more important causes. Cultural conflicts, the
channeling of mobilization from nonviolent into violent forms, local political opportunities for
success, and mobilization by social movement organizations convert ethnic conflict and violence
into riots. A comparison of riot and non-riot localities in eastern Germany supports this
argument.
Two large anti-foreigner riots in eastern Germany (at Hoyerswerda in September 1991 and
at Rostock in August 1992) created a political sensation, attracting far more attention, outcry, and
veiled approval from political leaders than two thousand smaller assaults on foreigners which
took place across unified Germany during those two years.  Explanations of the riots in unified
Germany, and also much of the theoretical work on anti-minority riots in other democratic
systems, have focused on three sets of causes:  ethnonationalism, insecure ethnic identities, and
racism; poverty, inequality, and competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources; and
political elites stirring up enmity to mobilize groups along ethnic lines.2
These analyses are flawed in two ways, which this article addresses.  First, they often treat
riots as simply the most extreme manifestation of ethnic conflict and violence, rather than as a
qualitatitively different phenomenon.  But because of their nature and their political significance,
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anti-minority riots should be analyzed separately from other forms of ethnic conflict.3  Of course,
violence is distinct from other forms of conflict in that it requires risky behavior, usually involves
some confrontation with police, and has terrible consequences for its targets.  Moreover, anti-
minority riots are a quite distinct form of ethnic violence.  By anti-minority riots, I mean
sustained physical attacks on members of a subordinate ethnic minority group by large numbers
of people who belong to the dominant ethnic group, are motivated by ethnic or racial animosity,
and are not agents of the state.4  Hence, anti-minority riots differ from commodity riots by
minority group members against property and police (often called "race riots"), and from hit-and-
run assaults by small groups against minority group members (racist violence).
Moreover, anti-minority riots in democratic settings have unusual political significance. 
Such riots often attract large numbers of approving spectators who are adults and are not
evidently members of extreme nationalist or racist organizations.  Hence politicians and news
media may interpret the riots as indicators of widespread and salient ethnic antagonisms. 
Therefore, political reactions to anti-minority riots can lead to major policy shifts, such as
immigration restrictions or limitations on minority rights.  Furthermore, because of the scale of
the mobilization, other perpetrators may try to imitate the attacks.  At Hoyerswerda and Rostock,
crowds of many hundreds or several thousands of adults gathered to watch the skinheads attack
the foreigners' housing, sometimes cheering on the attackers and chanting anti-foreigner slogans.
 The riots were heavily covered by television and other news media, and they touched off large
numbers of violent attacks against foreigners across unified Germany and fueled a national-level
political debate on the right to political asylum; ultimately, they helped lead to a constitutional
amendment sharply restricting asylum rights in May 1993.5
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Second, most of the work cited above is based on analyses of riot cases and ignores cases
where riots did not occur.6  Taken together, these two flaws have led to an overemphasis on
variables, such as racism and poverty, which are much more common than anti-minority rioting
is.  Such factors do not help explain why riots rather than other forms of ethnic conflict occur. 
Even within countries, regions, and historical periods where ethnic riots occur, many localities do
not experience riots, although small-scale racist violence may occur there.  For example, in
Britain, the number of racially motivated attacks against non-white people ranged between about
1200 to 2300 annually in the late 1980s and early '90s, but Britain has not had any anti-black
rioting since 1965.7  In Germany, skinheads and neo-Nazis carried out 1100 arson attacks against
foreigners' housing and property between 1990 and 1992, but only six major riots against
foreigners occurred during those three years, all in eastern German communities.8
In this article, I aim to help identify the additional conditions which tend to turn ethnic
conflicts, including small-scale violence, into anti-minority riots.  To that end, I first draw on
theoretical work which specifically addresses anti-minority riots in order to elaborate plausible
hypotheses, in the next section.  The bulk of the article then analyzes contrasting cases in eastern
Germany soon after the unification of East and West Germany.  I compare Hoyerswerda, and to a
lesser extent Rostock, with Riesa, an eastern German locality which experienced no rioting and
indeed little anti-foreigner violence in the early 1990s.
My main argument is that if anti-minority riots are analyzed as a distinct phenomenon and
via a cross-sectional approach, local political processes appear to be important causes of the riots,
while ethnic competition and national political processes are evidently less important.  In
particular, the following factors which tend to convert lower-level ethnic conflict and ethnic
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violence into major riots:  cultural conflicts, the channeling of mobilization away from
nonviolent forms and into violent forms, the local provision of political opportunities for success,
and mobilization by social-movement organizations.  In the conclusions, I suggest that these
local processes can help explain why riots are more likely in two circumstances:  after ethnic
groups migrate to new localities in democratic countries, and while an ethnically diverse country
experiences a chaotic transition to democracy.
Theoretical Approaches and Hypotheses
Racist and Xenophobic Attitudes Although xenophobia is a popular explanation of the
German riots, hostile attitudes toward minorities in fact are not closely related to rioting. 
Negative (even racist) attitudes toward foreigners have been very widespread in Western
European countries in the 1980s and '90s, yet only Germany had anti-immigrant riots in that
period.9  Moreover, eastern Germany in the early 1990s did not have generally higher levels of
xenophobia than western Germany, but the riots occurred only in the east, where rates of anti-
foreigner violence were also much higher.10  Racism or xenophobia are obviously necessary
conditions for anti-minority riots, but unfortunately the quantity of such attitudes sufficient to
produce riots seems low enough to be widely available.  Because xenophobic attitudes comprise
a poor explanatory factor of cross-sectional differences, and because attitudinal data is basically
nonexistent at the local level in Germany, I will not pursue this hypothesis further.
Ethnic Competition and Economic Grievances Ethnic-competition theory has been widely
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applied to ethnic conflict, including anti-minority riots.11  The theory holds that competition for
scarce resources between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups, e.g. due to increases in
immigration or unemployment, leads to riots and other violence as the dominant group tries to
protect or advance its material interests.  This might account for the eastern German riots, since
eastern Germany experienced massive increases in unemployment after unification and small
inflows of foreigners in the early '90s.  Hence the first hypothesis is that anti-minority riots will
take place in locations and at times with unusually high or rising unemployment rates and
immigrant population shares, since in those areas the competition for jobs and housing is most
intense.
Cultural Conflicts Park has argued that a minority group's differences in appearance and in
culturally rooted customs initially produce an apprehensive, defensive reaction from native
populations, in places where the natives have little experience of interacting with ethnic
strangers.12  Building on this idea, Husbands suggests that initial interactions between ethnic
groups are prone to spark conflicts which arise from different customs relating to noise,
sanitation, dress, sexual relations, religious practices, etc., and that these conflicts can lead to
territorial riots between ethnic groups.13  Riots are especially likely when actual differences in
cultural practices become exaggerated by racist or ethnonationalist stereotypes and rumors. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is that cultural conflicts spurred by the relatively recent arrival
of new ethnic groups become acute in the period before the beginning of rioting, and that large-
scale violence grows out of these cultural conflicts.
The cultural-conflicts theory suggests a link between immigration and rioting in eastern
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Germany which is different from that proposed by ethnic-competition theory.  In both cultural
conflicts and ethnic competition, members of the dominant group are offended or threatened by
what they perceive as efforts by the minority group to improve its position at the expense of the
dominant group.14  But in cultural conflicts, scarce economic resources are not at stake, and the
sources of conflict might be removed through communication and experience.
Facilitation and Channeling of Political Participation Anti-minority rioting can be
interpreted as rational political activity.15  Rioters may aim to drive members of the minority
group out of the area, to inflict enough harm to deter others from coming, or to increase the
power position of the dominant group relative to the minority within the locality.  As they pursue
their goals, potential participants in riots are best seen as "challengers," since they lack routine
access to authoritative decision making; they contrast with political elites such as government
officials, party leaders, and interest-group leaders, who enjoy such access.16  As challengers,
potential rioters are sensitive to political opportunity structures which in turn can be strongly
influenced by political elites.17  One main dimension of political opportunity structures is
"facilitation," i.e. lowering the costs and risks of taking certain kinds of political actions relative
to prior conditions and relative to other actions.18  Patterns of facilitation can explain why riots
occur, rather than merely smaller-scale violence, nonviolent protests, lobbying, or voting on
behalf of the anti-minority cause.
Indeed, bias, inaction, and vacillation by police have been recognized as crucial factors in
all kinds of riots.19  But elites' reactions to violence comprise only half of the facilitation process;
the other half consists of low-cost channels for nonviolent mobilization, such as anti-minority
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voting, contacting officials, and attending neighborhood meetings.20  Such channels have
different effects on instigators of violence, who engage in severe and provocative violence, and
on supporters, who shout and cheer, chant slogans, interfere with police, or merely serve as
sympathetic or interested audience members.  When nonviolent channels are available, potential
supporters of violence will tend to use them; hence, even if instigators carry out violence against
ethnic minorities, these attacks are unlikely to draw the crowds of supporters necessary to create
riots.
Therefore, the third hypothesis is that anti-minority rioting is much more likely when
political elites and institutions channel political participation by dominant-group members in two
ways:  by failing to provide low-cost, nonviolent channels for mobilization on grievances
concerning the minority group, or only channels which obviously are ineffective; and by reducing
the costs and risks which the perpetrators of anti-minority violence experience, especially
through police actions and inaction.
Political Opportunities:  National and Subnational The other main dimension of political-
opportunity structures concerns "opportunities," i.e. the probability that action by challengers will
help them achieve an outcome they desire, such as driving out the minority group.21 
Opportunities will appear to be greater if political elites publicly support anti-minority positions,
suggesting that further anti-minority mobilization, including riots, might tip the balance in favor
of anti-minority decisions by government.  For example, opportunities rise if political elites
engage in public debates about immigration-control policies, suggest that ethnic minorities might
be removed from a locality, give a hearing or other support to anti-minority groups, or make
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public statements hostile to the minority group.  Many authors have argued that national
politicians encouraged the 1990s riots in Germany by advocating restrictions on asylum rights.22 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is that anti-minority riots occur only after national-level political
elites show, via public statements or actions, that they share potential rioters' opposition to the
presence of the ethnic minority.
However, subnational elites may also be important in creating anti-minority
opportunities.23  Local government is relatively easily accessible to groups which are weakly
organized and poor in material resources; local politicians are often the first to respond to
emerging issues, and they may be more willing than national politicians to make anti-immigrant
or racist statements.24  Moreover, in Germany as in many countries, regional and local authorities
have substantial power over where minority populations are housed.  Therefore, the fifth
hypothesis is that anti-minority riots occur only after subnational political elites increase apparent
opportunities by signaling that they share potential rioters' opposition to the presence of the
ethnic minority.  Where subnational officials control the police, as in Germany, such signals may
also encourage rioting by shifting the pattern of facilitation, as posited in the third hypothesis.25
Social-Movement Organizations Although anti-minority riots are sparked by a wide range of
triggering events,26 riots do not necessarily begin and develop spontaneously, without
organization.  Rather, social-movement organizations may create triggering events or instigate
broader mobilizations on the basis of events created by others; organizations help solve the free-
rider problem of collective action.  "Social-movement organizations" here refers to either formal
organizations or loosely organized groups which undertake a challenge.27  Even small and
9
informally organized social-movement groups can induce their members to undertake risky
action by socially rewarding and sanctioning them.28  Studies of skinhead groups have noted that
their members attain important intangible benefits such as a sense of belonging in exchange for
undertaking risky actions.29
Social-movement organizations relevant to anti-minority riots have two qualities:  they are
opposed to ethnic minorities and they have offensive violence in their collective-action
repertoires.  Examples of youth groups involved in anti-minority riots include athletic clubs and
gangs in the 1919 anti-black riots in Chicago and Teddy boys in the 1950s anti-black riots in
Britain; examples of far-right organizations include right-wing groups in the 1905 anti-Jewish
riots in Odessa and the White Defence League in the 1958 Notting Hill, London riots.30 
Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is that violent, anti-minority social-movement organizations are
present in riot localities and an increase in their activities contributes to anti-minority riots.
Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Minority Violence in Unified Germany Just before and
after unification in 1990, Germany experienced a sharp increase in both immigration and
violence against its ethnic minorities, who seldom possess German citizenship and are typically
labelled "foreigners."31  Between 1988 and 1993, the foreign population of Germany increased by
2.4 million, including 1.4 million people from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa who applied for
political asylum and 200,000 who were living in East Germany before unification.  In addition,
about 1.6 million ethnic Germans "resettlers" arrived from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and
its successor states in this period, with constitutional rights to automatic German citizenship;
they were immediately classified as "German."32  Asylum seekers were attracted by rights
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embedded in the German constitution and courts, which allowed them to remain in the country
for many years while their cases were decided.33  Skinheads, other youths, and neo-Nazis carried
out an average of 400 arson attacks and 1300 other violent crimes against foreigners per year
from 1991 to 1993, about a ten-fold increase compared with the 1980s; attacks dropped sharply
after 1993, as did immigration.34  The main targets of attacks were asylum seekers, who were
distributed to the eastern states beginning in 1991.  In the east, victims of anti-minority violence
after unification also included foreign laborers from Africa and Vietnam, who had been recruited
by the East German government and were to remain in the eastern part of unified Germany until
their multi-year labor contracts expired.  By far the most important attacks were the riots at
Hoyerswerda and Rostock.  The political significance of those two riots, noted above, reflected
their duration, intensity, and number of participants, which made them the most serious anti-
minority attacks in post-war Germany.35
To test the hypotheses developed above, I focus on Hoyerswerda and Riesa Counties. 
Both localities lie within the eastern state of Saxony, which had the third-highest per-capita rate
of anti-foreigner violence among all German states in 1991.36  Yet over half of Saxony's fifty-
four counties and independent cities had no publicly reported attacks against the dwellings of
foreign workers and asylum seekers during the peak periods of violence in the state.37  Among
the low-violence counties, I choose Riesa County as a contrasting case of low anti-foreigner
violence which was matched with Hoyerswerda on many key dimensions.  Compared with other
Saxon localities in the early '90s, these two localities both had a medium degree of urbanization,
similar unemployment rates, a medium number of foreign residents, a relatively large group of
asylum seekers, a relatively large group of right-wing skinheads, similar levels of skinhead
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action, and local government effectively dominated by a grand coalition of the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD).38
In combining low violence with these structural features, Riesa is representative of many
other local cases in eastern Germany.  Within Saxony, there was little anti-foreigner violence
during the period studied in 10 out of the 19 localities (53%) which had large skinhead groups, in
16 out of the 29 localities (55%) which had stable or increasing shares of foreigners, and in 13
out of the 22 localities (59%) which housed at least 50 asylum seekers by the end of 1993.39  By
controlling for minority populations, unemployment, and skinhead organization, the
Hoyerswerda-Riesa comparison permits focusing on the potential effects of cultural conflicts, the
channeling of participation, the facilitation of violence, and local political opportunities.  The
hypotheses regarding ethnic competition and national opportunities will be tested by examining
evidence internal to each case, by comparing riot cases to the rest of eastern Germany, and by
analyzing temporal developments.
Hoyerswerda vs. Riesa:  Riots vs. Peaceful Ethnic Relations
Foreigners and Anti-Foreigner Violence in Hoyerswerda and Riesa Hoyerswerda and
Riesa were similar in many respects.  Foreign laborers, mainly from Mozambique and Vietnam,
had lived in Hoyerswerda County since the early 1980s; they worked mainly in the locally
dominant coal industry, on three-year labor contracts.  In addition, about 230 asylum seekers
from over twenty countries, principally Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Ghana, were
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moved into the city of Hoyerswerda by Saxon and local authorities in Spring 1991.40  Riesa in
1991 was an industrial county dependent on a few large employers in the steel industry.  In Riesa,
too, the East German government had brought hundreds of foreign workers to Riesa from
Mozambique, Vietnam, and Angola.  During 1991, 260 asylum seekers from at least 12 countries
arrived in Riesa County, as did 200 ethnic German resettlers.41
On 17 September 1991, right-wing skinheads began sustained, large-scale attacks on
foreigners in Hoyerswerda.  Attacks continued for four days against the foreign workers and were
followed by three days of crowds massing outside the asylum seekers' housing, which was in a
different neighborhood about three kilometers distant.42  The attackers used bottles, chains, clubs,
baseball bats, and molotov cocktails, threatened to burn down the building, and said they would
continue their attacks until the foreigners had left.  At the height of the rioting, 50-100 youths
attacked the foreigners' housing while crowds of 500 or more adults watched, shouted slogans,
cheered, and hindered police.  The attacks against the foreign workers continued until police
massed outside their housing, and the attacks against the asylum seekers continued until
authorities removed the victims from Hoyerswerda County to undisclosed locations in Saxony.
The violence was directed mainly against the foreign workers, whose housing was heavily
attacked night after night, while the actions against the asylum seekers took the form of a siege
and threats rather than heavy violence.  Nonetheless, the Hoyerswerda riots strengthened national
political forces which sought to restrict asylum rights.  The national leaders of the CDU and the
Christian Social Union (CSU), who governed in Bonn in a coalition with the liberal Free
Democratic Party (FDP), used the riots to try to pressure the opposition SPD to accept a
constitutional amendment aimed at reducing asylum applications;43 up to the present day,
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"Hoyerswerda" is a widely recognized symbol for the popular rejection of asylum seekers in
Germany.
Riesa had an active skinhead group of 20-35 youths, yet through the end of 1993, the Riesa
skinheads did not carry out a single concerted attack against the residences of asylum seekers or
other foreigners living in the county.  Skinheads tried to attack Riesa's asylum hostel several
times, but each attempt remained unsupported by neighbors, was aborted, and damaged little
property.  For example, in September 1992, in the wake of the Rostock riots and in the middle of
a large wave of attacks on foreigners' hostels throughout Germany, 30-40 youths from the
residential area around the Riesa County asylum hostel assembled outside it.  They were met by a
large police presence, and after police and youths waited for two hours, the group dissolved and
the youths went home.44
Ethnic Competition and Violence in Eastern Germany The hypothesis concerning ethnic
competition for material resources receives little support from these cases.  True, the anti-
foreigner riots in the eastern states occurred during a major economic crisis there, as the
introduction of West German currency caused industrial production to drop by about two thirds
during the second half of 1990; the real rate of unemployment, including those out of work and
on "short hours," reached about 29% in July 1991.45  The subjective sense of economic insecurity
was intense for many eastern Germans, who had experienced more than forty years of a
command economy with guaranteed employment.
But the anti-minority riots did not occur in the most objectively distressed areas of eastern
Germany.46  Hoyerswerda County's unemployment rate was several percentage points below the
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average for Saxony, and youth unemployment there actually dropped by a third from July
through October 1991; Rostock's unemployment rate was also below average.47  Furthermore,
although unemployment was rising, there was actually very little job competition between the
foreigners and the native population in Hoyerswerda.  The foreign workers had the most
dangerous or dirtiest jobs, which Germans normally were unwilling to take, e.g. working around
phenol in the local coal processing plant.48  Asylum seekers in Germany were completely banned
from employment until July 1991 and after then could receive work permits only if it could be
shown that no European Community citizen could do the job; in Hoyerswerda, asylum seekers
were not even required to do community work in exchange for social assistance, since local
officials wanted to reserve any such work opportunities for Germans.49  "Foreigners take our jobs
away" was a frequent complaint of Hoyerswerda residents, which shows that perceived
grievances may be necessary for anti-minority riots, but also that subjective perceptions of ethnic
competition can be produced in the absence of objective competition.
Finally, German residents were not threatened by large numbers of ethnic minorities.  Even
after two years of immigration, at the end of 1992 the foreign population share in eastern
Germany was only 2.8%, compared with 9.4% in the relatively low-violence western part of the
country.  The foreign population of Hoyerswerda actually declined during the nine months before
the riots; it was 36% lower in the city in August than it had been at the start of 1991, because
more foreign workers went home than asylum seekers arrived.50  Nor were foreigners competing
with Germans for apartments in Hoyerswerda, which had a housing surplus due to an overall
decline in population.  Indeed, both the foreign workers and the asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda
were living in buildings which had been occupied for years by foreign laborers, not by Germans. 
15
In housing, the potential for ethnic competition was actually greater in Riesa, where the total
number of foreigners was stable during 1991 and housing was scarce, with 3500 households
seeking apartments that year.51
Cultural Conflicts in Eastern Germany The differences in violence between the two cases are
much more closely related to differences in cultural conflicts.  In the city of Hoyerswerda, the
presence of small numbers of foreigners concentrated in the densely populated Neustadt section
led to cultural conflicts, mainly between the foreigners and their immediate neighbors.  Small-
scale conflicts between Germans and the foreign workers had occurred in the 1980s, but larger
conflicts were suppressed until after the East German state collapsed.52  Civil liberties were
effectively introduced in 1989-90, as hard-line Communist Party chair Erich Honecker resigned
in October 1989, the police and secret police stopped enforcing communist-era discipline, and
competitive national elections were held in March 1990.
Suddenly, eastern Germans' dissatisfaction with foreigners could be expressed much more
freely; in contrast, the foreigners' views about the cultural practices of their German neighbors
did not become the topic of political conflicts and newspaper reporting, which reflects the
foreigners' much weaker social and political position.  The main complaints by Germans in
Hoyerswerda concerned late-night noise, garbage, and reckless driving by foreigners; other
complaints concerned sexual relations between foreign men and German girls or young women.53
 The foreign workers and asylum seekers were housed in groups of over one hundred, which
concentrated the behaviors that many Germans found offensive, threatening, or
incomprehensible.  The problems were intensified by high-density housing; some Germans lived
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in the same twelve-story apartment complex occupied by the foreign workers, and many others
lived in adjoining or immediately neighboring buildings.  Conflicts over noise were exacerbated
by the fact that the Germans were on daily work schedules, while many foreign laborers worked
late shifts and the asylum seekers had much time on their hands since they were not permitted to
work at all.
The Hoyerswerda riots were closely related to these cultural clashes.  In September 1991,
as most foreign workers were preparing to leave for their countries of origin, noise from their
farewell party, described as especially loud, bothered their German neighbors.  A few days later,
these neighbors formed the bulk of the crowds which participated in the first nights of rioting. 
Moreover, when skinheads attacked Vietnamese at the start of the September 1991 riots,
Mozambicans counter-attacked by throwing objects from the roof of their building.  The sight of
black men fighting German youths frightened or outraged some Germans, and helped to draw
large crowds sympathetic to the skinheads who attacked the Africans.
The cultural conflicts between asylum seekers and their neighbors in Hoyerswerda were
exacerbated by public policies adopted by both the East German regime and by the Federal
Republic of Germany.  In East Germany, the state actively discouraged and prevented social
interaction between foreign workers and the German population.54  Therefore, conflicts between
Germans and foreigners were not tempered by friendships or channeled into nonviolent forms
along pre-existing lines of communication.  Furthermore, when asylum seekers arrived in
Hoyerswerda, local officials treated asylum seekers according to policies adopted by West
Germany's state and federal governments during the 1980s:  the ban on employment, a
requirement that asylum seekers live in hostels and stay within the county to which they were
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assigned, and inadequate personnel to mediate between them and their German neighbors.55 
These policies were intended to deter asylum seekers from coming to Germany, but they also
exacerbated cultural conflicts by concentrating the foreigners and limiting their normal economic
and social contacts with Germans.  Together with the decision to transfer asylum seekers to many
small localities in eastern Germany, these policies, set the stage for widespread cultural conflicts.
In a similar way, the intense riots at Rostock grew out of cultural conflicts between several
hundred asylum seekers, mainly Romas, and their German neighbors.  The Rostock asylum
hostel was badly overcrowded, forcing asylum seekers to camp on the lawns outside the building
and leading their German neighbors to complain repeatedly about noise, dirt, begging, and
gambling on the street.56  Residents' complaints eventually led to an anonymous call in the local
newspapers for a demonstration against asylum seekers.  The riots began the next day when a
crowd of 150 gathered outside the hostel.57
In Riesa, cultural conflicts between Germans and foreigners were much more limited. 
Conflicts did occur over the theft of car radios later found in the asylum hostel, begging by gypsy
children in the streets, and illegal trading by Vietnamese.58  But in Riesa the conflicts between
Germans and asylum seekers did not become matters of sustained public attention, in which the
skinheads could have intervened and found a sympathetic adult German audience.  One reason is
that county officials housed the asylum seekers in former workers' barracks on the edge of
Zeithain, a town of 4500 people about five kilometers from the county's largest city; unlike in
Hoyerswerda, large numbers of German neighbors did not immediately adjoin the asylum
seekers' building.  Although Riesa County was also home to over 600 other foreigners, mainly
laborers, the only conflicts between them and Germans were two small-scale attacks by
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skinheads against foreign businesses.59
The Channeling and Mischanneling of Political Participation These two cases strongly
support the channeling hypothesis.  In Hoyerswerda at the time of the 1991 riots, citizen-
participation mechanisms, such as public hearings, public dialogues between citizens and
officials, and citizen attendance of city or county council meetings, were very limited.  During all
of 1991, Hoyerswerda residents were publicly invited to only four meetings.60  In late August,
however, city councilors hastily called a public forum to deal with conflicts surrounding the
asylum seekers' hostel.  This heated, two-hour meeting began to create nonviolent channels
through which the asylum seekers' neighbors could participate.  Officials made some concessions
and promised another meeting with residents; moreover, they advised the neighbors on how to
report legal violations such as excessive noise to the authorities.  After unification, these
violations needed to be reported to the Town Clerk's Office (Ordnungsamt) rather than to the
police, which was the practice under the communist government.  Before the August meeting,
most residents of Hoyerswerda did not understand the new process, or why their complaints to
the police led to no action.61
By contrast, there was no public meeting for the Germans who lived near the foreign
workers, and those Germans did not learn about how to make more effective complaints about
their non-German neighbors.  These differences in political participation and political
information can explain why the rioting was much more intense against the foreign workers in
Hoyerswerda.62  Another difference is that the conflicts between the foreign workers and their
German neighbors went back at least several years, compared with several months of conflicts
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between the asylum seekers and their neighbors.
While nonviolent channels were extremely limited or nonexistent, political participation
was channeled into violence in Hoyerswerda during 1991.  Skinheads learned that they could
attack foreigners nearly with impunity, and hence many adult German residents came to see the
skinheads' methods as the most reliable ones for "doing something about the foreigners."63 
Moreover, skinheads gained visibility and a degree of legitimacy through vigilante activities
which were tolerated by the police and greeted by the population.  While crime was rapidly rising
during Winter 1990-91, a neo-Nazi group of about ten skinheads ("Neue Deutsche Ordnung")
was formed.  The group patrolled Hoyerswerda streets, offered fearful women rides home late at
night, took action against burglars and auto thieves, and sometimes handed their victims over to
the police.64
Crucially, Hoyerswerda police did not seriously interfere with the assault against the
foreign workers' housing on the first few nights of rioting in September.  A force level of one
hundred police officers was not reached until the third night of rioting, the foreign workers'
housing was not cordoned off until the fourth day, and eyewitnesses reported that the police were
passive and scared.  Deliberate police passivity was even more evident in the Rostock riots,
where police forces and equipment were adequate in size, yet police inaction during the first
three nights of rioting was remarkable.  Eventually police forces withdrew completely for two
hours, allowing seventy youths to set on fire a building housing over 100 foreign workers, all of
whom miraculously escaped over the rooftops.65
The extreme failure of policing in Hoyerswerda was due in part to difficulties caused by
the collapse of the communist system and the unification process.  As the old regime's secret
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police were disbanded, the regular local police forces proved to be inadequately trained and
equipped to deal with crime in a society no longer controlled by the communist Socialist Unity
Party.66  However, the police failure in Hoyerswerda was due also to the lack of a will to
intervene decisively against skinheads and crowds of Germans, and on behalf of foreigners. 
While the lack of will was apparent at all levels, the Saxony Interior Minister, Rudolf Krause
(CDU), played a key role by frequently downplaying right-wing violence and showing obvious
disinterest in protecting foreigners.  In Hoyerswerda, he announced that he wanted to avoid a
large police action, and that asylum seekers should be fenced in or evacuated to an army building
in a neighboring county.67
In Riesa, by contrast, cultural conflicts did not flare up dramatically in part because
political participation was channeled into nonviolent forms.  Violence against foreigners was
repeatedly and speedily suppressed by the police, while channels for citizen participation in many
areas were abundant.  As a result, the skinheads pursued other targets, and the other youth and
adult citizens of Riesa did not act with major open hostility toward the county's ethnic minorities.
Riesa's police acted decisively against right-wing youth almost every time the latter
engaged in violence; in particular, police did not allow skinheads to undertake vigilantism or to
dominate the streets during any period.  There were seven occasions during 1991 when police
prevented rioting by large numbers of right-wing youths.68  Police interfered especially with
skinhead attacks against foreigners.  For example, police turned up with a large force when the
asylum hostel was approached by 30-40 hostile youths in September 1992.  Unable to act
effectively against such a well-defended target, the skinheads tended to seek victims among
leftists and punkers in bars and discos, where the police were more reserved and the private
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owners or managers could not maintain order.69
Police acted more effectively in Riesa largely because their leaders were interested in
combatting right-wing crime and therefore the officers learned how to deal with it much earlier,
more quickly, and more thoroughly than the police in Hoyerswerda.  The Riesa police
experienced the institutional difficulties typical of eastern German police forces, and they
confronted high and dramatically increasing general crime rates after unification; Hoyerswerda
and Riesa counties had similar crime rates and similarly low rates at which crimes were solved.70
 But the Riesa police were successful in their priority areas, which included investigating
murders (seven out of seven cases were solved in one period) and suppressing crimes by right-
wing youth.71  The successes of the Riesa police were partly due to the practical, persistent, and
remarkably open-minded way they responded to their challenges.  Police leaders in Riesa were
open and communicative with the press, were willing to admit mistakes, and called on the public
for cooperation.72
The nonviolent channels of participation in Riesa were as open as the violent ones were
blocked.  Citizens groups were quite active, and the number of nonviolent demonstrations,
strikes, and petitions circulated was about three times as large as in Hoyerswerda.73  Furthermore,
Riesa officials normally held hearings and discussions on a wide range of local public-policy
issues; in 1991, there were 17 political meetings of all kinds in Riesa, four times the number held
in Hoyerswerda, with topics such as "the problems of youth in our city" or noise from a disco. 
These kinds of citizen participation are an indicator of the overall relations between citizens and
local authorities.  It is likely that any neighbors of the Riesa county asylum hostel who were
dissatisfied with the behavior of the hostel's residents would have felt comfortable approaching
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either the county employees managing the hostel, the police, or the elected officials of the town
of Zeithain or Riesa County.
National Political Opportunities There is little evidence that the national debate on asylum
rights accounts for the timing of the six major anti-minority riots which occurred in eastern
Germany from 1990-92.  Most obviously, there is little correlation between the debate and the
riots.  The Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots, the most serious of all these events, occurred during
relative lulls in the asylum debate.74  There are several other reasons to conclude that national
political opportunities had little effect on the Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and other eastern German
riots.  First, the national asylum debate was relatively unimportant in eastern Germany.  For
example, the tabloid BILD (Dresden edition) failed to cover the debate at all during the two
months prior to the Rostock riots, and the Rostock newspapers also carried few stories. 
Furthermore, eastern Germans consistently named economic problems as much more important
than issues related to foreigners, also in the periods just before the riots.  Only 8% of easterners
named asylum as an important problem in September 1991 (compared with 45% of westerners),
and the eastern figure rose to only about 20% in August 1992, compared with 60-80% who
named unemployment.75  Second, a brief riot by skinheads and youth against the foreign workers
in Hoyerswerda in May 1990 occurred during a long lull in the national asylum debate.76  Third,
if the national debate on asylum were a major cause of the Hoyerswerda riots, the asylum seekers
in Hoyerswerda would have been more important targets than they were.
Local Political Opportunities By contrast, local political opportunities for anti-foreigner
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mobilization increased just before the Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots.  Local authorities in
Hoyerswerda showed tacit support for anti-immigration positions in three ways.  First, county
and city authorities were passive and inattentive toward the issue of foreigners, although not
openly opposed to the minorities.  The officials' passivity helped create a political vacuum on the
issue, making it easier for the skinheads to assert an issue monopoly during the months leading to
the riots.77  Second, when local politicians and county administrators did address the issue at the
citizens forum a month before the riots, they seemed to opened opportunities for those who
wanted to advance the "Foreigners out" agenda.  At that meeting, acting mayor Klaus Naumann
(SPD) told the angry crowd that he would talk with other officials about possibly moving the
asylum seekers and would hold another meeting a month later.78  He thereby opened the
possibility of getting the asylum seekers out of the neighborhood even as he was trying to
channel residents' participation into negotiations and legal channels rather than violence.  A
similar pattern occurred in Rostock, where a city official, Peter Magdanz (SPD), tried to mediate
between disgruntled residents and the wholly unresponsive city and state governments.  Although
he sought a nonviolent solution, Magdanz's calls to have the asylum hostel moved to another
neighborhood probably increased expectations that the asylum seekers could be forced out
violently.79
Third, two widely reported police actions against foreigners by the Hoyerswerda police
strengthened the foreigners-out agenda by creating the impression that someone in authority was
finally willing to act against the foreigners.80  In particular, in early July 1991, 120 police from
several counties conducted a highly publicized raid of Vietnamese cigarette dealers on the
Hoyerswerda marketplace, arresting nineteen Vietnamese and one Turk.  These arrests seem to
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have influenced the skinheads' choice of targets; two months later, the riots were touched off
when eight skinheads attacked a group of Vietnamese traders on the street where they normally
sold untaxed cigarettes.
By contrast, local opportunities for skinheads to influence in-migration by foreigners were
quite small in Riesa, as official statements and actions were mainly educational and pro-
foreigner.  When asylum seekers arrived, Riesa's authorities initiated a small information
campaign, designed to reduce prejudices and gain the natives' acceptance.  During 1991-93,
authorities held three meetings with German residents about asylum seekers (including a heated
five-hour discussion with soldiers at the Zeithain army base) and caused several informative
articles about asylum seekers to appear in the local newspaper.81
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Social-Movement Organizations:  Skinhead and Neo-Nazi Groups The organizational
basis for anti-minority violence was certainly present in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Riesa.  A
network of skinhead groups had become established in both East and West Germany during the
late 1980s and had grown to about 6500 participants, 3000 of them in eastern Germany by
1991.82  These groups, consisting mainly of working-class teenage boys and increasingly under
the influence of neo-Nazi organizations in this period, emphasized group loyalty, hostility toward
the adult society, and violence against relatively weak groups, especially foreigners and leftists. 
The network of skinhead groups in Hoyerswerda was stronger than in most places in Saxony. 
The instigators of violence included a hard core of about thirty youths who used neo-Nazi
symbols and slogans and were prone to violence, and another twenty sympathizers who were
friends of hard core members.83  In Rostock, too, a large group of local skinheads and right-wing
youth were involved in the riots.  Moreover, on the second night of rioting, skinheads and neo-
Nazis came to Rostock from other cities in Germany; they brought hard-core leadership and
aggressive tactics, such as setting cars on fire to create barricades.84
Nonetheless, the Riesa case shows that organized and active perpetrators are not sufficient
to produce anti-minority riots or significant anti-minority violence.  Although Riesa skinheads
formed a relatively large group and were at least as criminally active as their counterparts in
Hoyerswerda (with 11 skinhead crimes against all targets reported over a 15-month period in
Riesa compared with eight in Hoyerswerda), most of the Riesa skinheads' actions were attacks on
leftist youth, or train and bus stations.85
Conclusions:  Immigration, Democratization, and Anti-Minority Riots
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In the early 1990s, eastern Germany was characterized by a transition to democracy,
immigration, and a series of anti-foreigner riots.  Hence analyzing this setting can provide insight
into the processes which link both recent immigration and transitions away from authoritarian
rule to anti-minority riots.  The evidence presented here is that local political processes were the
main causes of the eastern German riots, not ethnic competition or national opportunities.  In-
migration by ethnic minorities led to riots in those localities where cultural conflicts were
heightened by certain housing practices, where residents' participation was mischanneled, where
local opportunities for anti-minority politics were provided, and where social-movement
organizations mobilized.
In eastern Germany, the local processes which linked migration to riots were made much
more likely by German unification, which involved rapid, chaotic transitions to both
representative democracy and a market economy.  These transitions created many major tasks
and problems simultaneously, such as economic privatization and the reconstruction of public
administration.  Distracted by these matters, many state and local officials failed to respond
effectively to the conflicts between Germans and foreign minorities, which would have required
housing foreigners carefully, creating channels for nonviolent participation, and decisively
policing the skinhead groups.  However, as the Riesa case illustrates, many local and state
officials in eastern Germany did respond effectively, which shows that the political failures were
at the subnational level and not only the national level.86
Where attempts to extend democratic rights are accompanied by the collapse of state
authority over an ethnically diverse population, anti-minority riots often result.  For example,
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anti-Jewish pogroms in Odessa after the 1905 October Manifesto in Russia, anti-Muslim riots in
India before Independence, and assaults on Romas' houses after the fall of communism in
Romania fit this pattern.87  The local political processes identified in the eastern German cases
may be important links between democratization and riots in other cases, too, though not
necessarily the only links.  That is, if a transition to democracy occurs in the context of long-
suppressed cultural conflicts, then the sudden granting of civil liberties for anti-minority groups,
combined with delays in creating nonviolent channels and developing adequate police forces,
may cause riots.
Even where representative democracy is established, migration and cultural conflicts often
precede anti-minority riots.  For example, anti-black riots in northern U.S. cities before World
War II, riots against West Indians and South Asians in Britain from the late '40s to mid-60s, and
anti-Italian and anti-Turk riots in the Netherlands in the 1960s and '70s all occurred relatively
soon after significant numbers of the minority group had arrived.  Moreover, in those three
countries, there is evidence that riots grew out of cultural conflicts between the long-time
residents and the newcomers, over matters such as the use of knives in fights, sexual jealousies,
and prostitution.  The practice of housing ethnic minorities in hostels made riots especially likely
since hostels concentrate the behaviors which the dominant group finds threatening and also
make the minority group more vulnerable to large-scale attack.88
Are anti-minority riots a transient phenomenon?  Husbands argues that the importance of
cultural conflicts explains why anti-minority riots are often limited to the early, "immature"
phase of ethnic relations, and are then replaced in later phases by small-scale racist violence
(undertaken by the dominant group) and commodity riots (by the subordinate group).89  There are
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four main reasons why anti-minority rioting tend to decline after the initial phase of majority-
minority contact; all of these have operated to large though varying degrees in the industrialized
democracies and can account for the apparent end of anti-minority rioting there.  First, the
minority and majority groups have gained experience with each other, in residential areas and in
workplaces, so that cultural differences are hidden, ignored, or recognized as banal rather than
becoming fuel for great fears and wild rumors.  Second, political elites often have reacted to riots
by creating nonviolent channels for conflicts between dominant and minority ethnic groups, and
by avoiding creating opportunities for anti-minority groups.  Similarly, police often have become
better prepared to prevent riots.  Third, apparent opportunities for removing ethnic minorities
have become less available than when immigrants were first arriving.  In West European
countries and in most U.S. cities, the sheer size and long presence of minority populations make
demands for removing them less plausible than at the onset of migration; growth in the
minorities' social and civil rights has also dampened their enemies' prospects.
The fourth reason is paradoxical.  In many countries, far-right parties have become
electorally successful by making anti-immigrant appeals and eschewing violence, or else
mainstream parties have become more willing to sound anti-minority themes.90  In either case,
when parties mobilize against immigrants, this may help to channel anti-minority sentiments into
electoral politics and away from violence, even though at the same time it heightens those
sentiments.91
Nonetheless, anti-minority rioting does not necessarily cease in representative
democracies, as the experience of contemporary India shows.  The four processes just sketched
are contingent on many other developments.  Where migration of ethnic groups to new areas
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continues (even on a local or regional scale), where minorities remain socially unintegrated,
where channels for nonviolent participation remain weak, where mainstream politicians choose
to openly encourage violence, where nationalist parties promote violence instead of a purely
electoral strategy, where international borders are in dispute, and where policing breaks down,
anti-minority riots will be more likely.
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